Physical Address

304 North Cardinal St.
Dorchester Center, MA 02124

Can ASEAN address the Myanmar Crisis?

The Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) adopted a cautious approach in its dealings with Myanmar, in line with its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member States. Soon after the military takeover, the Asean Leaders’ Meeting was convened on in 2021, and the leaders agreed on the Five Point consensus (FPC). First, they demanded an immediate end to the violence and urged all sides to show restraint. Recognising the need for dialogue, they proposed a facilitated discussion among all parties involved in the conflict. To lead this mediation, a special envoy to be appointed by the chair of Asean. Humanitarian aid would also be delivered through the AHA Centre. Finally, the plan called for the special envoy to visit Myanmar and meet with all stakeholders involved in the conflict. It has been three years since the formulation of this FPC, a supposed roadmap to peace, hasn’t stemmed the violence or fostered dialogue. Asean needs a more robust strategy.
Though Asean’s restrained involvement in Myanmar’s crises should be viewed in the context of its institutional and diplomatic principles, FPC and its provisions have often been criticised as mere diplomatic efforts which provide an ideal solution on paper but aren’t able to respond to the situation on the ground. In a personal interview with one of the diplomats from NUG-MoFA, he affirmed that Asean’s response to Myanmar people’s revolution has not been satisfactory because Asean’s engagement is not based on even the Asean Charter. In order to implement the FPC, Asean needs a strong political as well as administrative action so that the people would see the relevance of Myanmar’s membership in Asean. In the background of inputs from various discussions with senior NUG diplomats and civil society groups in Myanmar, here are a few suggestions which can help ASEAN implement the FPC. ASEAN must strive to mediate between all parties involved in Myanmar’s peace process, including the NUG and other EAOs. Though the military regime recently offered talks to end the ongoing conflict in the country, the opposition has rejected the offer. Here, it is important to reassess the role of ASEAN Special Envoy.
The senior diplomat from NUG-MoFA stated that the role of Special Envoy is not more than a reporter to the ASEAN governing body, merely coordinating and mediating a talk between parties. He stated that since the special envoy is not an independent position, he/she has to work with and reflect the political position of the government who chairs Asean. Also the envoys function with tight deadlines. Though the diplomat appreciated the role of Indonesia in setting up the Office of the Special Envoy in Jakarta to engage stakeholders, it is suggested that the special envoy should be appointed with clear terms of reference and beyond the chair’s tenure for continuity and effectiveness. It is hoped that Malaysia will take an active role to engage with Myanmar people in accordance with the principles of Asean. And the efficacy of discussions involving all involved parties hinges on the requirement for all sides to halt violence, a fundamental stipulation also outlined in the FPC.
It is often suggested that Asean leaders must move beyond their countries, and involve regional players to address the crisis in Myanmar. Asean plus neighbourhood countries–India, China and Bangladesh–could provide an appropriate platform to address the crisis which affects the region as a whole. The senior diplomat from NUG MoFA specifically mentioned that India as a federal democratic Union has a very significant role in the current Myanmar people’s revolution to show its sympathy to Myanmar’s people who are fighting for justice, democracy and federalism and should stand with the people of Myanmar. Developments in Myanmar affect not just the domestic arena but the whole region.
Finally, for the people of Myanmar who are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, efforts must be made to build coalitions/partners to establish humanitarian corridors. UN Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzer called for a “united regional approach to end violence and establish a protection framework for vulnerable populations in Myanmar”, urging Asean to discuss regional refugee protection and monitor violence. Thailand and Malaysia play crucial roles due to their proximity to Myanmar. India, Bangladesh and China could also establish corridors with Asean nations to support these humanitarian efforts. However, concerns remain about the aid’s effectiveness and distribution, as it is expected to benefit only areas under the control of the Myanmar military. Therefore, to reach areas controlled by ethnic resistance groups, the NUG has proposed an alternative assistance plan of working with local civil society organisations.
Even though Asean statements reaffirm the FPC as a primary reference, it acknowledges the FPC’s incomplete implementation. In November 2022 and September 2023, the Asean member States reviewed the implementation of the FPC (RDI-5PC), and maintained that the FPC will remain as the main reference for addressing the crisis, urging the Myanmar armed forces to de-escalate violence, and continue engagements with relevant stakeholders in Myanmar. Furthermore, Asean leaders emphasised the importance of collaboration with the international community and specifically focussed on including neighbouring countries to address the crisis and its impacts. These steps, if taken immediately, may hold some potential to slow down the violence and instability in the country. In the long-run, if Asean leaders are unable to enforce any progress in the FPC, then collectively the leaders may need to reassess its relationship with Myanmar. To conclude, it is well accepted that there is a need for a Myanmar-owned and led solution as stated by Asean foreign ministers, during a meeting in Laos.
This article is authored by Cchavi Vasisht, research associate, Centre for Neighbourhood Studies, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi.

en_USEnglish